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1. Introduction 
 
The prominent role of the World Bank (WB) in designing and implementing development 
policies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been heavily discussed within development 
economics for the last 30 years. Because the Bank’s policies largely failed to produce 
economic growth in the region till the mid-1990s, SSA became an important case study in 
the debate on what went wrong. This came close to an existential crisis in the profession.1 
Continued WB involvement, the unstable and unequal nature of economic growth in SSA 
since the early 2000s and the sustained precariousness of debt levels (despite large scale 
debt relief in 2005) have made the debate all the more relevant in recent years.2 
 The policy failures of ‘market-fundamentalism’ in the 1980s and 1990s seemed to 
shift the WB towards a more contextualized development approach throughout the 
2000s. This included a larger possible role for the state and more attention to national 
peculiarities in development, in contrast to the earlier ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach for 
which the WB had come to be known. This development has been taken as cause for 
celebration.3 However, from a critical point of view, this optimism seems unfounded. 
While the WB has slowly acknowledged the importance of institutions and the state for 
economic development, much of this has merely been discursive and the fact that politics 
lie behind these institutions hasn’t been readily recognized. Despite a prolific debate, little 
has truly changed considering the actual implementation of development policies because 
of the continued improper attention to the inherent political nature of development.4 
                                                          
1 Jayati Ghosh, “A Brief Note on the Decline and Rise of Developments Economics”, Rethinking Development 
Economics Draft Paper (Cape Town, 2001), 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/(httpPublications)/2DA5AEC5C09E51E7C1256BC900459
735?OpenDocument [last consulted 11-12-2019]. 
2 William Battaile et al., “Debt Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unravelling Country-Specific Risks”, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7523 (Washington, 2015); Keith Palmer, “Why are sub-Saharan Economies 
Not Growing Sustainably?”, Enterprise for Development Discussion Paper (2017). 
3 Joseph Stiglitz, “Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?”, in: Narcís Serra and Joseph Stiglitz (ed.), 
The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (Oxford, 2008); Carlos Lopes, 
“Economic Growth and Inequality: The New Post-Washington Consensus”, Revista Criticia de Ciências Sociais 4 
(2012). 
4 Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont, Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution 
(Washington, 2013); K. Sarwar Lateef, Evolution of the World Bank’s Thinking on Governance (2016), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/433301485539630301/WDR17-BP-Evolution-of-WB-Thinking-on-
Governance.pdf [last consulted 11-12-2019]. 
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The problem is that much scepticism still exists among practitioners on how useful 
more politically aware approaches can be.5 The idea that development requires relatively 
straightforward technical solutions seems deeply engrained within the development 
community.6 This has fostered a stubborn adherence to ‘best practice’ approaches that 
continues to ignore the inherently historical and political rooted nature of countries’ 
socio-economic problems, which decisively influence the implementation and 
consequences of economic policies in practice.7 
 This thesis seeks to engage with this scepticism by asking why the World Bank’s 
stated goals have not matched the actual consequences of its policies in Malawi 
since 1981. The hypothesis is that many economic policies have been ineffective or had 
unforeseen adverse effects because they were implemented without proper attention to 
historically rooted socio-economic and political structures. This lack of attentiveness to 
local political economy has meant that little real improvements have been made to 
Malawi’s society and economy, despite years of WB involvement. This hypothesis is tested 
through an historical analysis of the implementation and consequences of WB 
development policies in Malawi. The analysis will also look at the political-economic 
legacy of Malawi’s colonial era as it is underlies the country’s contemporary development 
problems. 
If the hypothesis is correct, it will mean that historical experience contradicts the 
existing scepticism towards the possible benefits of more politically aware development 
approaches. This would mean that elite interests, historical socio-economic structures 
and (in)formal institutions intersect to have a defining impact on the way development 
policies play out, therefore requiring proper attention in future policy design. These 
insights would be applicable beyond Malawi as many SSA countries seem to suffer from 
context-specific impediments to equitable, sustainable growth, as they have been subject 
to comparable ‘best practice’ WB policies with differing, but often detrimental effects.8 In 
                                                          
5 Alina Rocha Menocal, Getting real about politics. From thinking politically to working differently (ODI London, 
2014). 
6 Ibid.; Carothers and Gramont, The Almost Revolution; Kate Bridges and Michael Woolcock, “How (Not) to Fix 
Problems That Matter. Assessing and Responding to Malawi’s History of Institutional Reform”, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 8289 (December 2017, Washington). 
7 Ibid.; OECD-DAC, Lessons Learned on the Use of Power and Drivers of Change Analyses in Development Co-
operation (Paris, 2005);  
8 Thandika Mkandawire, “Maladjusted African Economies and Globalisation”, Africa Development 30:1&2 
(2005), 1-33; Jeffrey Sachs et al., “Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap”, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 1 (2004); 
David Williams, “Managing Sovereignty: The World Bank And Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Mondes en 
Dévelloppement 123:3 (2003), 5-21. 
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the end, this would strengthen the recent demand for more contextualized socio-
economic development, increasing pressure on the WB and other practitioners to change 
their ways. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The proposal that the lack of attention to political economy in WB programmes harms 
development raises two questions. Firstly, is it true that the WB pays inadequate attention 
to non-economic factors in policy design, despite its own rhetoric? Secondly, if that is the 
case, why is that a problem and what’s the alternative? A review of the evolution of the 
WB’s paradigm helps to illuminate the lack of actual change in relation to the criticism 
expressed in the wider debate. Meanwhile, political-economic analyses which have 
explicated this issue also offer an alternative. 
 
2.1 The World Bank’s Paradigm: From the Washington to the (New) Post-
Washington Consensus. 
The rise of neoclassical economics in the late 1970s presented a sharp turn away from the 
WB’s earlier state-focused development approaches. Neoclassical economists argued that 
SSA economies were performing poorly because their markets were over-regulated and 
over-taxed due to extensive state interference. On the basis of econometric models and 
free trade theory did they point to the benefits of comparative advantage in the 
production of economic growth. The awesome powers of the market just needed to be 
unleashed to lift Africa out of poverty. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which 
aimed to do so were generally designed to be as apolitical as possible. This was caused by 
a sincere belief in economics as an objective science and distrust of state interference, but 
was also instrumental in pushing through unpopular reforms as policies were presented 
as unavoidable.9 When the SAPs failed to produce growth, neoclassical economists argued 
that this was because liberalizing policies had not been correctly implemented.10 
Adherents of adjustment pointed at the widespread neo-patrimonial nature of SSA states 
– informal patron-client relations in which state resources are used to secure the loyalty 
of clients – as an obstacle to economic transformation. While price liberalization, 
deregulation and monetary reform were commonly implemented, few regimes indeed 
were willing to risk their own position by privatizing significant state enterprises or 
                                                          
9 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. “Development”, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in 
Lesotho (Cambridge, 1990); 
10 Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, “Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
13:3 (1999), 3-22; David Dollar and Aart Kraay, “Trade, Growth and Poverty”, The Economic Journal 114:493 
(2004), 22-49; World Bank, Adjustment in Africa (Oxford, 1994). 
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reorganizing the civil sector.11 Resultingly, a small shift occurred within what was then 
called the Washington Consensus from ‘purely’ economic measures to institutional 
economics in the early 1990s.12 Apart from opening up to the global economy, loans were 
now also made conditional on political reforms, such as the implementation of a multi-
party system. This stemmed from the belief that development will occur through the 
combined growth of economic and political freedom.13  
The shift to institutional economics presented a first look at the potential role of 
politics in development. However, it remained limited to the attempted imposition of a 
prefabricated Western democratic model, instead of an analysis of local politics.14 This 
was problematic, because the implementation of such ‘best practice’-policies led to an 
almost exclusive focus on the institutional determinants of economic performance. As the 
policies were assumed to be sound, a lack of growth had to be caused by incorrect 
implementation or corruption. As a result, the lack of growth in SSA was largely blamed 
on African governments.15 The continuingly unequal and unstable nature of economic 
growth in the 1990s and early 2000s however made these arguments increasingly 
inadequate, which generated extensive criticism of the dominant development 
paradigm.16 
New analyses showed that the Bretton Wood institutions were accomplices in the 
implementation failure of policies, for which they had blamed governments. Many 
development projects had payed inadequate attention to existing economic and political 
structures within countries, leading to ineffective or even counterproductive measures.17 
The WB, driven by its own internal ideological and bureaucratic logic, had kept allocating 
funds to programs clearly failing.18 As such, regimes dragging their feet had been kept in 
the saddle. They simply implemented neoliberal demands for e.g. budget cuts by lessening 
their development ambitions, making African citizens bear the costs of these policies. Sam 
                                                          
11 Pierre Englebert and Kevin Dunn, Inside African Politics (Boulder/London, 2013), 238-239. 
12 A typical recent example is: Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity and Poverty (London, 2012). 
13 Exemplified by Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, 1999). 
14 Ha-Joon Chang, “Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history”, Journal of Institutional 
Economics 7:4 (2011), 473-498. 
15 Jomo Kwame Sundaram et al., “Globalization and development in sub-Saharan Africa”, DESA Working Paper 
102 (2011), 2. 
16 See: Alfredo Saad-Filho, “Growth, Poverty and Inequality: From Washington Consensus to Inclusive Growth”, 
DESA Working Paper 100 (2010), 5-6. 
17 Margaret McMillan et al., “When Economic Reform Goes Wrong: Cashews in Mozambique”, NBER Working 
Paper 9117 (2002). 
18 Robert Calderisi, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working (New York, 2006). 
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Hickey has even argued that the WB ignored Uganda’s opposition to multi-party politics 
as they wanted a success story for their ‘new institutional approach’, in the process 
encouraging cronyism and rentier forms of capitalism undermining the productive basis 
of the economy.19 
Critics therefore argued that the Bank’s policies themselves were to blame for 
Africa’s lack of growth. The great divergence between South-East Asia and Africa since the 
1970s stressed the potential power of a dirigist state to encourage growth, in contrast to 
the state-minimalism of WB programs.20 Likewise, the case studies of Asian economies 
presented a strong charge against the democratic bias of the new institutional economics 
mentioned above, as most of these countries did not have a lot of democratic freedoms 
yet arguably developed successfully.21 The impressive economic growth in countries 
which didn’t follow WB guidelines called the universal applicability of the Bank’s theories 
into question. In contrast, the inability of many African countries to respond to most 
economic incentives, as they lacked the infrastructure and bureaucratic means following 
enforced liberalization, seemed to stress the need for a more embedded form of 
development.22 
The WB slowly picked up on this criticism and started to stress the need for a more 
contextualized approach throughout the 2000s. Developing from the basic ideas Joseph 
Stiglitz had proposed in the late 1990s, it publicly declared that one-size-fits-all market-
oriented policies are doomed to fail.23 In contrast, the WB stated that policies should 
indeed be designed on a per-country basis. This would allow room for experimentation, 
the possibility of bringing the state back in and paying attention to social, cultural and 
political factors in development as to create ‘inclusive growth’.24 The unravelling of 
inconsistencies within neoliberalism during the global economic crisis of 2008 seemed to 
                                                          
19 Sam Hickey, “Beyond the Poverty Agenda? Insights from the New Politics of Development in Uganda”, World 
Development 43 (2013), 194-206, 195. 
20 Joseph Stiglitz, “Rethinking Development Economics”, The World Bank Research Observer 26:2 (2011), 230-
236; Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder. Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London, 2003). 
21 Kenichi Ohno, “The East Asian growth regime and political development” in: Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno 
(ed.), Eastern and Western Ideas for African Growth (London, 2013), 37-61. 
22 Mkandawire, “Maladjusted African Economies”. 
23 Charles Gore, “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries”, 
World Development 28:5 (2000), 789-804. 
24 World Bank, Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (Washington, 2005); Stiglitz, 
“Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?”. 
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accelerate this policy shift, leading some to cheerfully declare that a ‘(New) Post-
Washington Consensus’ had been achieved.25 
 
2.2 The Political-Economic Alternative 
However, from a critical perspective, this enthusiasm seems ill-founded. While the WB 
has paid more attention to the role of institutions and politics in economic development, 
much of this has been merely discursive.26 The Bank has failed to meaningfully include 
social, political and cultural factors in project design, as the alterations to its actual 
approach have been severely limited.27 This can be seen in the continuingly detailed 
prescriptions of ‘correct’ economic policies in its documents, despite claims from the WB 
that it no longer wishes to present strict blueprints. These policies still stress the need for 
market access, integration into the world economy and economic growth, while largely 
ignoring the nature of such growth and questions of equity and distribution. Policy failure 
is still explained through an ignorance of ‘correct’ policies or through deviousness of 
governance (such as corruption). This disregards other possible causes of policy failures 
(such as bad implementation design) and the WB’s own role in sustaining political-
economic impediments to development.28 
In contrast, Paul Cammack’s criticism that the WB’s increased attention to the role 
of the state in economic development has focused on creating a more deeply embedded 
form of neoliberalism still seems to apply today.29 While the proponents of the Post-
Washington Consensus have presented it as a distinct break with the Washington 
Consensus, it is fair to point out that the WB has remained fundamentally pro-market. 
Instead of truly diversifying its methods, the Bank has merely brought the state back in as 
a complementary factor to the market. Any government’s main goal is to create market-
friendly institutional frameworks, such as stability, infrastructure and a sound judicial 
system, to allow the market to produce economic growth. Toby Caroll likewise pointed 
                                                          
25 Ibid.; Lopes, “The New Post-Washington Consensus”. 
26 Saad-Filho, “Growth, Poverty and Inequality”. 
27 Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity. The IMF, World Bank and WTO (London/New York, 2009); Kate Bayliss et al., The 
Political Economy of Development: The World Bank, Neoliberalism and Development Research (London, 2011); 
Ali Burak Güven, “Whither the post-Washington Consensus? International financial institutions and 
development policy before and after the crisis”, Review of International Political Economy 25:3 (2018), 392-417. 
28 See: Saad-Filho, “Growth, Poverty and Inequality”, 14-15; World Bank, What is Inclusive Growth? 
(Washington, 2009), 7-11, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/468980-
1218567884549/WhatIsInclusiveGrowth20081230.pdf.  
29 Paul Cammack, “What the World Bank means by poverty reduction, and why it matters”, New Political 
Economy 9:2 (2004), 189-211, here 200. 
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out that the WB’s understanding of ‘social factors’ has been limited to the utilization of 
social capital in establishing capitalist citizens. By providing debt-based funding through 
village councils, groups and individuals were stimulated to both think and work as market 
participants.30 Economic and political ties among countries’ elite, the ownership of the 
means of production or culture-dependent forms of social behaviour are still largely seen 
as redundant in project design and treated superficially.31 Instead, the task of poverty 
reduction is conflated with a technical process designed to foster market forces.  
Although one could take issue with the sustenance of a neoclassical capitalist 
system, the WB’s policies could also be taken as sound if they achieved their own goals of 
inclusive, sustainable socio-economic growth. The problem is that they don’t. Despite the 
discursive acceptance that politics matter, the de facto continuance of neoclassical 
economics has meant that markets have retained ontological priority as the “natural 
means of creating economic order”.32 This has likewise meant that political power 
relations continue to be regarded as somewhat of an externality, implying a separation 
between economics and politics. As a result, WB analyses of institutions have remained 
overtly simplistic and its policies therefore shallow.33 They address the outcomes of 
political-economic structures with technocratic means, failing to engage with the 
underlying concentration of power and resources in the hands of political and economic 
elites. This has hindered socio-economic development by misunderstanding the causes of 
developmental problems, inadvertently fostering predatory rent-creation and 
overlooking how technocratic reforms fail due to political-economic structures.34 
Critical authors have doubted whether (WB) development can help SSA at all.35 I 
however belief this goes too far, as they criticize the current approach without really 
considering how development could be made to work. The reason why the shift towards 
a more politically and historically aware development approach has stunted lies in what 
Carothers and Gramant have called the ‘Almost Revolution’. While there has been a 
                                                          
30 Toby Carroll, “’Social Development’ as Neoliberal Trojan Horse: The World Bank and the Kecamatan 
Development Program in Indonesia”, Development and Change 40:3 (2009), 447-466. 
31 Consider for example: Richard Record et al., From Falling Behind to Catching Up. A Country Economic 
Memorandum for Malawi (Washington, 2018), 1-11, 47-60. 
32 Frank Stilwell, “From Economics to Political Economy: Contradictions, Challenge and Change”, American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 78:1 (2019), 35-62. 
33 Chang, “Institutions and economic development”. 
34 Carothers and Gramont, The Almost Revolution, 4-5. 
35 William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New 
York, 2013); Gilbert Rist, The History of Development (London, 2019). 
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growing discursive acceptance that non-economic factors play a role in socio-economic 
development, development agencies in general have proven to be hesitant to alter their 
policies. While there are numerous factors at play (see Bridges and Woolcock in detail), 
the biggest issue seems to be that practitioners are not convinced about the benefits of a 
more contextualized, less technocratic approach due to a lack of analytical proof.36 
Malawi, as a clear example of best approach failure, can provide part of this analytical 
proof and help to alter the status quo. We will now first take a look at the used 
methodology, before analysing the history of Malawi’s political economy in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
36 Carothers and Gramont, The Almost Revolution; Bridges and Woolcock, “How (Not) to Fix Problems That 
Matter”. 
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3. Methodology and Relevance 
 
3.1 Research Question 
As has likely become clear from the literature review, criticism of the WB’s lack of 
attention to historical local circumstances and politics is not new. However, both the 
debate and the WB’s attention to other perspectives have developed significantly over the 
last twenty years. As the problems associated with the dominant best-practice approach 
are slowly becoming apparent within the mainstream, it seems fair to suggest that this 
offers an opportunity to finally produce a fundamental shift in the way the WB practices 
development by strengthening the political-economic criticism entering the mainstream. 
The history of economic development in Malawi clearly shows the effects of technocratic 
development and as such substantiates the thesis that the lack of attention to political-
economic specifics has severely hampered development efforts in Malawi (and elsewhere, 
as many SSA countries have been subject to comparable ‘best practice’-policies).37 The 
historical analysis of WB policies in Malawi (more on case selection below) is therefore 
helpful in problematizing contemporary development in SSA by explicitly relating policy 
failure to political-economic factors, in the process contributing to a better approach. 
 
3.2 Political-Economic Approach 
The above mentioned lack of historical awareness has partly resulted from a 
preoccupation with technical solutions and quantitative analysis within mainstream 
(development) economics. While very useful in its own right, econometric analysis is 
somewhat ill-equipped to take into account the diverse and numerous social, economic 
and political variables which are relevant to the implementation of development policies 
and the nature of poverty if taking a general country view.38 This has generated an 
excessive reduction of the complexity of reality, which by extension has led to the 
treatment of Malawi and other SSA countries as cases merely needing comparable 
economic and democratic fine tuning. This has been reflected in the lack of attention to 
                                                          
37 Williams, “Managing Sovereignty”. 
38 Martha Starr, “Qualitative and Mixed-Methods Research in Economics: Surprising Growth, Promising 
Future”, Journal of Economic Surveys 28:2 (2012), 238-264; Michael Bamberger (ed.), Integrating Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research in Development Projects (Washington, 2000). 
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the nature of African growth since the early 2000s, as an overt focus on statistical data 
and GDP diverted attention from its unequal and unsustainable characteristics.39  
In this regard, political-economic analysis is a powerful tool for improving the 
effectiveness of development economics, as it explicitly focuses on the distribution and 
contestation of power and resources over the years.40 As such, it lays bare the economic 
and political structures which have for an important part determined Malawi’s socio-
economic development, revealing the underlying interests, incentives and institutions 
that have enabled or frustrated development. This helps illuminate the context into which 
WB policies were implemented, allowing for their fair assessment. This thesis therefore 
uses a political-economic macro-level country analysis, aimed at engaging with said 
structures underpinning Malawian society and economy. While mostly qualitatively 
driven, this approach is augmented by datasets on GDP growth, agricultural production, 
government budgeting and fiscal deficits, among others, as to present a comprehensive 
picture of the concurrent socio-economic and political development of Malawi since 1964. 
This data has been drawn from the statistical office of Malawi, the WB databank and a 
range of earlier works on the subject.41 
To give a representable assessment of the WB policies which have been 
implemented in Malawi over the span of almost 40 years, I have chosen to take the main 
projects of the two dominant WB development paradigms as objects of analysis. The first 
one concerns the SAPs of the 1980s and early 1990s, which focused on industrial and 
especially agricultural liberalization and macro-economic stabilization as to foster socio-
economic development. The second one is the mentioned shift to institutional economics 
with the good governance agenda from the early 1990s onwards, for which we will focus 
on the consequences of the shift to a multi-party democracy till the present day. The effect 
of WB policies will be measured against the goal of shared/inclusive socio-economic 
growth as stated by the WB itself.42 
                                                          
39 Palmer, “Not Growing Sustainably”; Morten Jerven, Africa. Why economists get it wrong (London, 2015), 74-
102. 
40 OECD-DAC, Lessons Learned. 
41 Such as: Frederic Pryor, “Income Distribution and Economic Development in Malawi. Some Historical 
Statistics”, World Bank Discussion Papers 36 (Washington, 1988). 
42 World Bank, Report and Recommendation for a Third Structural Adjustment Operation to Malawi No. P-
4172MAI (25-11-1985), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/911651468046778153/text/multi0page.txt [last consulted 11-12-
2019], 17-19; World Bank, Report and Recommendation for an Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Program 
to Malawi No. P-4778-MAI (25-05-1988), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/374081468272377234/text/multi0page.txt [last consulted 11-12-
16 
 
By focusing on these two broad programmes, I do leave out some variables on 
development in Malawi. The first one is AIDS, a disease widely spread and with adverse 
socio-economic consequences. However, as pointed out by Conroy et al., AIDS does not 
really cause economic downturn, but simply exacerbates the poverty trap Malawi finds 
itself in.43 Also considering that there already has been extensive work on that subject by 
Conroy, I deem it fair to ignore this factor considering the political-economic focus of this 
inquiry. The other one is ethnicity, which at times has been discussed as a potential 
impediment to broad development in Malawi since the onset of a multi-party system.44 
However, although electoral results indeed often follow ethnic and regional lines, the 
extent of collective elite capture of politics and economics in Malawi arguably diminishes 
the importance of ethnicity as a factor in this regard.45 Furthermore, as there have also 
been electoral results to the contrary (such as in 2009), I do not deem ethnicity a 
fundamental variable for development in Malawi at this time. 
 
3.3 Why the World Bank in Malawi? 
The choice to focus on the impact of WB policies is based on the central role the bank has 
fulfilled in development in Malawi since the country made its first loan request in 1981. 
The extensiveness of this influence is not to be underestimated. Donors on average 
provide between ⅓ and ½ of the government’s funds (consider figure 1), and 80% of the 
development budget. Around the beginning of the 2000s, aid formed a quarter of annual 
GDP.46 
While the WB provides a decent amount of these funds, this is not the primary 
reason for analysis, as we could have taken any large donor in that case. Instead, both the 
influence and leverage of the WB is greater than the funds it provides, as it largely works 
in tandem with other bilateral and multilateral donors.47 Without WB involvement or 
                                                          
2019],  24-26; Luis Lopez-Calva and Carlos Rodriguez-Castelán, “Pro-Growth Equity: A Policy Framework for the 
Twin Goals”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 7897 (Washington, 2016). 
43 Anne C. Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS  and Hunger. Breaking the Poverty Trap in Malawi (New York, 2006), 81-
82. 
44 Eunice Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi: State, Economic Structure and Neo-Liberal Hegemony (PHD Thesis, 
Kingston, 2001); Arne Tostensen, Malawi: A Political Economy Analysis (Oslo, 2017). 
45 Diana Cammack, “Malawi’s Political Settlement: Crafting Poverty and Peace, 1994-2014”, Journal of 
International Development 29:5 (2017), 661-677. 
46 Diana Cammack, “Poorly Performing Countries: Malawi, 1980-2002”, ODI Background Paper 3 (London, 
2004), 15-16. 
47 See: Michael Hodd, “Africa, the IMF and the World Bank”, African Affairs 86:344 (1987), 331-342, also for 
exceptions to the rule. 
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approval, other donors are likely to abstain from funds provision. This happened for 
example in 1992, when the World Bank Consultative Group, as the leading representative 
of the transnational lending community, decided to withhold non-humanitarian aid until 
the Malawian government showed signs of moving towards the establishment of a multi-
party democracy.48 
The importance of the WB as an object of analysis is further strengthened by the 
fact that it has largely coordinated development in Malawi since 1981. In contrast to the 
IMF, the WB has dedicated itself to long-term development projects. It coordinates these 
with the IMF, but primarily for the latter to be involved in shorter term loans to prop up 
budget deficits in cases of emergency. The WB’s influence is further enhanced by its 
decisive impact on which ideas in development become dominant, as the Bank employs 
the largest group of development economists in the world and has strong ties with many 
governments.49 As such, the WB is beyond doubt one of the most important actors in 
influencing Malawi’s development since the early 1980s and its policies are therefore the 
primary object of analysis for this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
48 Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi, 237. 
49 Hodd, “Africa, the IMF and the World Bank”, 340-341; Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein (ed.), Owning 
Development. Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank (Cambridge, 2010). 
Source: Cammack, “Malawi, 1980-2002”, 16. 
Figure 1 Foreign and local resources as part of budget expenditures. 
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Finally, Malawi is an interesting case study, as it adopted a form of ‘managed capitalism’ 
with a strong primary commodity export-orientation at independence. The WB spoke 
very enthusiastically about these ‘realistic’ liberal economic policies when it got involved 
in 1981, and since then Malawi has ranked first in WB documents when it comes to the 
implementation of their policy recommendations and forms of economic liberalization.50 
However, Malawi also still ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world, with very 
unstable economic growth. This conundrum of ostensibly successful policy 
implementation and sustained underdevelopment offers a clear opportunity to scrutinize 
the consequences of WB policies in practice as they were successfully implemented 
according to the Bank’s own statements.51 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
50 Mkandawire, “Maladjusted African Economies”, 12; Jane Harrigan, “Book Reviews”, Journal of African 
Economies 1:1 (1992), 151-163. 
51 World Bank, Third Structural Adjustment Operation No. P-4172-MAI (25-11-1985); World Bank, Industrial and 
Trade Policy Adjustment Program to Malawi No. P-4778-MAI (25-05-1988). 
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4. Malawi’s Economic History, 1891-1979 
 
This section explores the long-term implications of the economic and political structures 
relevant to socio-economic development which were established in Malawi under British 
rule between 1891 and 1964. While Malawi indeed achieved political independence in 
1964, its political economy remained inherently colonial. As such, this chapter sketches 
the context in which WB policies were implemented and the assessment which was made 
of these circumstances. What I consider to be the continued colonial economy consists of 
3 main elements. Firstly, the country became incorporated into the international economy 
with a narrow estate-based export sector, making the country dependent on external 
revenue and setting the basis for Malawi’s continued vulnerability to price shifts on the 
world market. Secondly, post-1964 ownership of these estates simply shifted from a 
European to an African elite. As the preferential economic treatment that these 
plantations received continued, revenues accrued mainly within this elite. Thirdly, the 
undemocratic centralized state which had dominated the colony continued post-
independence, with a large amount of power concentration in the figure of the president 
(replacing the governor) and the mentioned elite. As such, the colony’s political economy 
came to define Malawi’s ‘postcolonial’ state and economy with little structural alterations. 
 
4.1 Building the Estates, 1891-1961 
Nyasaland, which would later be named Malawi, became a British ‘protectorate’ in 1891, 
marking the onset of 73 years of British rule. The colonialization of the region followed a 
standard pattern. Ambiguous treaties were made, troops were used to make resistors 
‘come to their senses’ and the creation of the colonial administrative structure transferred 
political power to the British, marginalizing Africans in economic and political decision 
making.52 
 The colony’s first governor, Harry Johnston, saw himself faced with a large 
financial challenge as the British foreign office had informed him that the treasury would 
not provide revenue to support the protectorate, except for the salaries of civil servants. 
A lack of available mineral resources led the administration to pursue an agriculture-
                                                          
52 Consider for a detailed (and biased) first-person description by the colony’s first governor: Harry Johnston, 
British Central Africa (London, 1897), 80-151, https://archive.org/details/britishafrica00johnuoft/page/n17 [last 
consulted 11-12-2019]. 
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based export economy to generate revenues. Most indigenous agriculture in the region at 
the time however consisted of subsistence farming, with limited trade and exports. A 
capitalist export culture thus had to be created, which was done by introducing the notion 
of private (instead of communal) land and a habit of land alienation. This process had 
already started prior to the establishment of colonial rule, with small numbers of 
Europeans (57 in 1891, 300 by 1896) acquiring land through trade, warfare and treaties 
with chiefs (which promised them protection from Portuguese colonists and explorers).53 
This process was accelerated by the Johnston administration, which introduced a new 
land ownership structure between 1892 and 1894.54 Land was classified in two ways, 
either as ‘freehold’ (which basically meant that it was held by Europeans) or as ‘crown 
land’, which meant that it belonged to the British state. In practice, this meant that 
European estates could fairly easily accrue the most fertile land through the support of 
the colonial administration, leading to a clear-cut division of the country’s agriculture in 
two sub-sectors: the European estate sector, producing export crops, and an African 
peasant or ‘smallholder’ sector, mainly producing foodstuffs. At the end of 1894, 15% of 
cultivated land was already held by a small number of Europeans, with 72% of these acres 
belonging to a mere 11 estate holders.55 
 The plantations enjoyed benefits beyond owning the best land. In contrast to the 
smallholders, they faced no restrictions on the crops they could grow. The most lucrative 
ones, such as flue-cured tobacco and tea, were even the exclusive domain of the estates as 
to maximize their possibilities of generating revenue.56 Furthermore, estate owners had 
access to cheap labour, which was commonly drawn from the African population whose 
villages and farms happened to be on the bought properties. The indigenous notion of 
thangata, which in pre-colonial times had meant as much as reciprocal agricultural help 
between members of the same community, was basically reinterpreted as a form of forced 
labour. Colonial commissions argued that ‘…what first brought the native and the 
European together was a contract of labour in exchange for ground on which the native 
could make his garden and build his hut … this system is purely native life and its 
                                                          
53 Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi, 60. 
54 Johnston, British Central Africa, 112-113. 
55 Pachai Bridglai, “Land Policies in Malawi: An Examination of the Colonial Legacy”, The Journal of African 
History 14:4 (Cambridge, 1973), 681-698, here 683. 
56 John Pike, Malawi: A Political and Economic History (London, 1968), 174. 
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continued existence … shows that it has practical convenience for both sides”.57 The 
African population logically did not agree, but despite various uprisings such as the 
Chilembwe riot of 1915, the regime’s labour policy saw little true alterations.58 
 While the smallholder sector was not completely neglected, it remained vitally 
subdued to the primacy of the estates and the financial needs of the colonial 
administration. For example, following a severe cotton shortage in 1902 (due to unstable 
prices caused by speculative trading in the USA), Britain sought to reduce its dependence 
on US grown cotton and started encouraging its production in the colonies.59 The colonial 
state in Malawi therefore stimulated peasant cotton production through e.g. tax rebates. 
Such policies however lasted only two growing seasons, because it led to a reduction in 
the labour supply for the estate sub-sector as most African farmers preferred growing 
their own cotton.60 Despite such unreliable and often restricting state intervention, cotton 
and especially tobacco production (low-earning types such as dark-fired western leaf, as 
                                                          
57 1921 Land Commission of Nyasaland, as quoted in: J.A.K. Kandawire, “Thangata in Pre-Colonial and Colonial 
Systems of Land Tenure in Southern Malawi”, Africa 47:2 (1977), 185-191. 
58 See for a discussion: Jenny de Nobel, A right to land? Population density and land rights in Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, 1923-2013 (MA thesis, Leiden, 2016), 53-54. 
59 See: Allen Isaacman and Richard Roberts (eds.), Cotton, Colonialism and Social History in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Portsmouth, 1995). 
60 Leroy Vail, “The State and the Creation of Colonial Malawi’s Agricultural Economy”, in: Robert Rotberg (ed.), 
Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central Africa (Lexington, 1983), 39-87, here 61. 
Source: Vail, “Malawi’s Agricultural Economy”, 63; Martin Prowse, “A history of 
tobacco production and marketing in Malawi, 1890-2010”, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies 7:4 (2013), 691-712, here 697. 
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prime tobacco was reserved for the estates) within the smallholder sector grew rapidly 
(see figure 2). 
In response, the marketing of peasant produce was monopolised by state 
marketing boards, a practice which would be continued after independence. The ‘Native 
Tobacco Board’ was first established in 1926, while cotton was regulated through state 
sanctioned traders until 1951, when a cotton board was created. In the following year, a 
marketing board for foodstuffs was also set up. These boards would be merged in 1956 to 
create the Agricultural Production and Marketing Board, which formed the basis for the 
post-independence Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). All 
of this is important, because the boards were used by the colonial and postcolonial regime 
to siphon revenues from the smallholders to the government and the estates, basically 
constituting a bottom-to-top income redistribution. The given rationale of the colonial 
state was that this kind of agricultural marketing would be more efficient and stabilise 
prices for peasant producers. However, by determining ‘reasonable prices’ for peasants 
and paying them well below true market profits, the board put great limits on the 
possibilities for smallholders to develop their farms, while once again favouring the 
estates.61 
 Underlying this approach to smallholder farming were racist and paternalistic 
attitudes, which both favoured the idea of Africans working for the European elite and 
considered African agriculture too underdeveloped to be enabled to develop on its own 
(despite the clear growth in production).62 The tensions this system logically created 
between the African and European population grew markedly after the Second World 
War. In response, the colonial state sought to expand its political base among rural 
producers by creating a class of so called ‘yeoman’ or ‘master farmers’. The idea was that 
the best individuals among the smallholders would be encouraged to develop their plots 
through cash bonuses and the availability of free seeds, fertiliser and advice.63 However, 
as Sahle has pointed out, “little success was achieved in the long run since these policies 
did not address the fundamental issues … such as the monopolisation of peasant 
production and availability of land”.64 
                                                          
61 R.W. Kettlewell, “Agricultural Change in Nyasaland: 1945-1960”, Studies in Tropical Development 5:3 
(Stanford, 1965), 229-285, here 248. 
62 Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi, 71. 
63 Kettlewell, “Agricultural Change”, 274-275. 
64 Sahle, 71. 
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4.2 Independence and State-led Capitalism, 1961-1979 
As such, by the late-1950s, Nyasaland had developed into an elite-led undemocratic state 
with a narrow economic and political basis. Despite the administration’s conviction that 
the estate sub-sector would be the engine of growth, its development policy had largely 
benefited the social and economic elite with limited trickle-down effects. This resulted in 
a poor country with a highly illiterate population and a lack of economic opportunities 
and arable land for smallholders, which was further exacerbated by a growing population. 
The skewed socio-economic structure this created provided the anti-colonial movement 
with its main ammunition to criticise the colonial state.65 It is therefore somewhat 
surprising that the emerging elite of the independence movement in practice focused 
almost exclusively on political independence. Despite a strong socio-economic rhetoric, 
little actual regard was given to the social and economic structures which made up the 
country or the question how the country should be run after independence. Instead, the 
nascent African elite which would take over the country in 1964 mirrored the autocratic 
tendencies of the colonial state, showcased by an intolerance of dissent and an advocacy 
of the concentration of power in one national party on the grounds that this was 
consistent with local cultural norms.66 This put constraints on personal freedom and civic 
liberty in the post-independence state, while in the long run also leading to a government 
once again largely serving an economic and political elite with limited responsiveness to 
the needs of the broader population.  
This is not to say that no attempts at all were made to foster smallholder 
production in the first years following independence. The government launched four 
integrated rural development programmes with some WB support as to increase the 
production of cash crops by smallholders.67 These programmes consisted of considerable 
investments in rural infrastructure, land improvement, farmer education and the 
provision of services and credit. The general logic behind this approach was sound, in the 
sense that successful agricultural development required a comprehensive approach 
which tackled not just agricultural projects themselves but also connected issues, such as 
infrastructural constraints. Yet, despite significant investments and a relative decline in 
the importance of estate agriculture till 1966 (see figure 3), increase in smallholder 
                                                          
65 See for a more detailed discussion of the anti-colonial struggle; Sahle, “Democratisation in Malawi”, 74-88. 
66 John McCracken, A History of Malawi, 1859-1966 (Woolbridge/Rochester, 2012), 374-375. 
67 Frederic Pryor, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth. Malawi and Madagascar (Oxford, 1990), 
72-75. 
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production disappointed for a variety of reasons. Firstly, most of the technology and credit 
packages offered were unsuitable for everyone but the largest smallholders, because of 
the required investments in capital goods and the need for trained personnel. Secondly, 
the still enforced requirement to sell export crops to the Farmers Marketing Board for a 
relatively low price limited growth, as this meant fewer opportunities and incentives for 
farmers to invest money in their farms. Thirdly, constraints on the availability of land, 
especially in the southern and central regions of the country, remained unaddressed, 
hindering effective supply-side response from smallholders. Together, these factors 
meant that the grand agricultural projects mainly benefited richer farmers, inadvertently 
contributing to the former colonial ‘wager-on-the-strong’ development policy.  
Source: Pryor, Poverty, Equity and Growth, 86. 
Figure 3 Estate Sector Data, 1955-1984.  
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In response, the regime of president Hastings Banda shifted its developmental focus to 
the estates once again, continuing the favourable treatment they had received under 
colonial rule. The official aim was to create a propertied elite, which would take the lead 
in development and inspire their countrymen to do the same. This however also handily 
served to consolidate Banda’s political base by creating socio-economic ties and political 
debt between his regime and wealthy Malawians.68 Estate support took a wide variety of 
forms. For starters, legislation which would have allowed smallholder production of 
burley tobacco and other ‘estate’ cash crops was cancelled in 1965. This meant that the 
smallholder sub-sector was largely directed to focus on low-profit food production. A 
whole bunch of Land Acts were introduced between 1965 and 1967, which allowed the 
Minister of Agriculture to convert customary into private land, inherently transferring 
smallholder land to the estate sector and allowing its acquisition by people with capital 
or enough political sway to obtain the necessary credit.69 The credit came from two 
sources; firstly, the country’s only two banks were controlled by Banda and his political 
allies, which instructed the banks to provide credit to the estates.70 Secondly, the Farmer 
Marketing Board remained in place, paying smallholders by one estimate as little as 40 to 
60% of actual crop value, investing the profits made this way in the estate sector.71 As 
such, it should be no surprise that Banda and close allies also bought a bunch of estates 
for themselves. Together with a boom in crop - especially tobacco - prices on the world 
market did these economic-political arrangements set the stage for the great expansion 
of the estate sector from the late 1960s onwards and an impressive record of economic 
growth. 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 81. 
69 See: Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi, 175. 
70 Prowse, “A history of tobacco”, 701. 
71 J. Kydd, “Malawi in the 1970s: Development Policies and Economic Change”, in: Kings Phiri et al. (eds.), 
Malawi, An Alternative Pattern of Development (Edinburgh, 1985), 333. 
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While estimates differ, GDP grew around 6% per year between 1965 and 1979 (see figure 
4), with the estate sector, being its engine, growing at 17% per year.72 Despite these 
numbers, which also compared favourably to other SSA countries at the time, growth 
proved both highly uneven and inherently unstable. On the former, the concentration of 
investment in and the preferential treatment of the estate sector indeed led to the creation 
of a small, wealthy elite. However, the predicted trickle-down effects, both in a material 
sense and the hope of technological and entrepreneurial fertilisation through example, 
didn’t materialise. This was largely due to the above mentioned constraints on the 
smallholder sector, which meant that few non-estate farmers could respond to or even 
received viable economic incentives to increase production. Land alienation for the estate 
sector was also to blame, as it had meant a reduction of land available to smallholders. 
This was exacerbated by a rapidly growing population, which led to the accelerating 
fragmentation and degradation of plots (a process which continues till this very day).73 As 
such, due to the government’s focus on an elite-led economic, rather than social 
development approach, most of the wealth from Malawian exports accrued within an 
economic-political elite which had “well vested interests in the state control of the 
economy”.74 
                                                          
72 Jane Harrigan, “U-Turns and Full Circes: Two Decades of Agricultural Reform in Malawi 1981-2000”, World 
Development 31:5 (2003), 847-863, here 848. 
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74 Guy Mhone (ed.), Malawi at the Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Political Economy (Harare, 1992), 44. 
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Economic growth was also unstable, due to the deeply interconnected structure of 
Malawi’s political economy and a lack of sources of income other than tea and especially 
tobacco exports. Since 1964, the Banda regime had steadily increased its control over the 
Malawian economy. A mere three companies - namely the Malawian Development 
Corporation (MDC), Press Holdings (Banda’s personal conglomerate) and ADMARC (the 
aforementioned marketing board which was created out of the Farmer’s Marketing Board 
in 1971) – were controlled by the political elite and heavily involved in all sectors of the 
economy. As both banks were also state-owned, Malawi’s entrepreneurial landscape was 
effectively dominated by these 3 elite-owned, inherently parastatal companies (consider 
Sahle’s tables on the next few pages).75 Not only is it likely that this limited private 
investment and industrial development,  but it also meant that the country was made very 
vulnerable to recessions. MDC, Press, ADMARC and the banks all had large outstanding 
investments and debts in one another. When the economy went sour from 1979 onwards, 
Malawi’s entire economy including the state’s budget was affected in a domino-like 
fashion. 
The country’s conscious dependency on agricultural exports also meant a 
structural economic risk. Industrialization didn’t really take off in the relatively open 
Malawian economy, a sector which only grew slightly from 8% of GDP in 1964 to 12% in 
the early 1980s.76 Industrial growth was also thwarted by low levels of effective consumer 
demand in the internal market, which for an important part resulted from the vast social 
inequalities realised by Malawi’s elitarian economy. As a significant portion of the existing 
industry was also agriculture-related (e.g. tobacco processing), it didn’t offer an 
alternative source of revenue when cash crops faltered. 
 
As such, by 1979 a state-backed elite preceded over an inherently colonial and centralised 
‘capitalist’ economy, occupying all key positions in the agrarian, commercial and 
industrial sectors. A range of external shocks would however plummet the narrow basis 
of the Malawian economy into structural problems in that year, leading to the continued 
involvement of the WB from 1981 onwards. The assessment made of these circumstances 
by the WB and the then implemented policies are the subject of the next chapter.  
                                                          
75 Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi, 189-190. 
76 Ben Kaluwa, “Malawi Industry: Policies, Performance and Problems”, in: Mhone, Malawi at the Crossroads, 
204. 
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Figure 5 MDC and its Subsidiary Companies 
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Figure 6 ADMARC’s Commercial Investments 
Figure 7 Other MDC-Press-ADMARC Investments 
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5. Economic Adjustment without Structural Change, 1979-1991 
 
The external shocks 
which derailed the 
Malawian economy in 
the late 1970s were 
threefold, and came in 
quick succession. Due 
to the Second Oil Crisis 
and the corresponding 
rise in transport costs, 
trade declined with 
35% as at the same 
time cash crop prices 
on the world market 
contracted. While this 
would prove to be the 
onset of the broader 
SSA debt crisis of the 
1980s, Malawi’s 
situation was exacerbated by the escalating civil war in Mozambique (partly caused by 
the Banda regime itself, because it supported Mozambican rebel groups), which disrupted 
its two main export lines (see map and the rise of freight costs throughout the 1980s in 
figure 8). The collapse of income was then finished off by a drought in 1980 and 1981, 
Source: Ben Kaluwa, The Structural Adjustment Programme in Malawi: A Case of Successful Adjustment? 
(Harare, 1992), 4. Note: High inflation occurred in Malawi in the late 1980s, which largely explains the 
ostensible explosion of freight costs from 1987 onwards. 
Figure 8 
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leading to severe food shortages and forcing the government to import maize, prompting 
budget deficits and increasing debt.77 
 In response, Banda opened negotiations with the WB for a two-year Structural 
Adjustment Loan (SAL-1), which was agreed on in June 1981. Eventually, this would lead 
to a whole range of adjustment programmes (including 5 SAL’s) throughout the 1980s, 
which all sought to encourage productivity, diversify the export base and further promote 
exports through agricultural liberalisation and stabilization of Malawi’s macro-economy. 
They aimed to do so by strengthening government policy making while also reducing 
government spending.78 
The general problem with all these Adjustment Programmes however is the 
limited assessments on which these policy recommendations were based. Most WB 
reports from this period spoke highly of the development policies pursued by the Banda 
regime since independence. The economic downturn was therefore regarded as the 
unforeseen consequence of external shocks, which could be solved by further removing 
market impediments. Fostering market forces would boost economic growth by 
presenting Malawians with more incentives to produce export commodities and diversify 
their export base. Policy reform mainly focused on agriculture because of its economic 
dominance.  The WB however did not fully understand the structural constraints placed 
on smallholders by the historic duality between the smallholder and estate sector, nor did 
it consider the economic-political power structures which kept this duality in place. This 
generated some fundamental problems for its programme of agricultural liberalization to 
succeed and actually allowed the estate sector to expand even further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 World Bank, Third Structural Adjustment Operation No. P-4172-MAI (25-11-1985), 2. 
78 Ibid.; World Bank, Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Program No. P-4778-MAI (25-05-1988). 
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5.1 Agricultural Liberalization 
The WB correctly noticed that relative smallholder export production largely lagged 
behind the estate sector and saw this as an opportunity for renewed economic growth. 
The problem is that the WB almost exclusively considered ADMARC price controls as the 
main market impediment to increased and diversified production. As mentioned, it is very 
true that ADMARC’s policy of paying smallholders below world market prices had meant 
a bottom-to-top income redistribution, largely to the benefit of the estate sector. It 
therefore made sense to reduce such implicit export taxes by decontrolling prices and 
removing or limiting ADMARC’s monopoly, as the possible increase in income for 
smallholders could foster production. To make the most out of this policy, maize prices 
were held down and fertiliser subsidies targeted for removal to further the incentive to 
increase and diversify export crop production in the smallholder sector.79 However, price 
liberalization did not generate the desired effect, as other fundamental constraints 
remained ignored, presenting a continuation of earlier ‘colonial’ policies and inhibiting 
most smallholders to respond effectively. 
 For starters, smallholders strangely remained precluded from the production of 
prime tobacco, tea and sugar, which were maintained as estate-crops. Instead, they were 
supposed to increase production of cotton, groundnuts and ‘lesser’ forms of tobacco. WB 
reports from this time period do not even mention this constraint, merely focusing on 
price controls.80 Whether completely overlooked or deemed not important enough, the 
continued reservation of the most profitable cash crops for the estate sector allowed the 
elite to keep constraining smallholder production in this area, thus limiting both 
competition and plausible changes in income.81 The possible benefits which could have 
been generated can be illuminated by the early 1990s, when prime tobacco production 
was finally liberalized.  Districts with a concentration of smallholder production saw an 
economic boom, and the WB even claimed that “…smallholder profits from burley sales 
have provided the largest ever cash injection of income in rural Malawi”.82  
 The issue of land shortage and alienation, which had been a topic throughout 
Malawi’s colonial history, was likewise ignored by the WB. The Land Acts introduced in 
                                                          
79 Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS  and Hunger, 94. 
80 E.g. World Bank, Program Performance Audit Report No. 6833 (Washington, 1987), 9, 52. 
81 Prowse, “A history of tobacco”, 702. 
82 Ibid.; World Bank, Accelerating Malawi’s Growth: Long-Term Prospects and Transitional Problems 
(Washington, 1997). 
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the 1960s had allowed the Banda regime to provide Malawi’s economic-political elite with 
leased estates, as ministers could easily convert customary land into private land. 
Together with the preferential treatment the estates received, the sector had expanded 
greatly from the mid-1960s onwards (see figure 3, P24), withdrawing land from the 
customary sector and thus reducing the lands available to smallholders. While this 
logically caused disruption and unrest in several areas of the country, it was not generally 
known abroad due to Banda’s tight grip on the media.83 However, when the WB got 
involved from 1981 onwards, it allowed the Banda regime and its ‘subsidiaries’ to 
continue this process of land annexation to the benefit of the estate sector. While the 
estates had absorbed some 300,000 hectares of customary land during the 1970s, they 
managed to carve out another 400,000 hectares between 1980 and 1993.84 In contrast to 
the 1970s, however, did the further expansion of the estate sector not lead to a recurrence 
of high economic growth. This was partly because of the slump of cash crop prices on the 
world market and rising transport costs, but also followed from the mismanagement of 
the estates themselves. Many members of the elite weren’t particularly concerned with 
the most efficient or extensive development of their estates as profits still accrued. As 
such, they lacked incentives to invest or develop all their plots, which lead to inefficient 
production considering the total amount of estate land.85 The latter explains the large 
divergence between the hectares of planted land and the total amount of hectares the 
estates annexed over the years.86 More problematically, however, did the intensifying 
process of land alienation under the not so watchful eye of the WB combine with an ever 
growing population to increase land shortages for the population at large. Available plots 
became smaller as they were divided at inheritance and land degraded at an alarming rate 
(both through inadequate fallows and extensive homogenous crop cultivation), further 
exacerbated by the necessitated usage of land not suitable for extensive agriculture.  
 This proved detrimental to the goal of broad development behind agricultural 
liberalization. In the early 1990s, a mere 25% of all smallholder holdings exceeded 1.5 
hectares, the necessary amount to be able to grow cash crops next to food crops. Many 
smallholders only had enough land to secure their subsistence (0.7 to 1.5), with no acres 
                                                          
83 Pauline Peters and Daimon Kambewa, “Whose Security? Deepening Social Conflict Over ‘Customary’ Land in 
the Shadow of Land Tenure Reform in Malawi”, The Journal of Modern African Studies 45:3 (2007), 447-472, 
here 451. 
84 Cammack, “Malawi, 1980-2002”, 48; Nobel, A right to land?, 62. 
85 Conroy et al., Poverty, AIDS  and Hunger, 93. 
86 Compare Pryor’s table on P22 with Cammack and Nobel above. 
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available to grow and sell surpluses. 35% of them even held less than 0.7 ha and were as 
such often incapable of producing enough food to make it around till the next harvest 
season.87 As a result, when the WB successfully pushed the Malawian government to 
increase producer prices and downsize ADMARC, only larger farm owners could respond 
effectively. WB analyses from this period stand in stark contrast with later assessments. 
While the WB argued in 1985 that “about 75 percent of the rural population are receiving 
higher incomes”,88 David Sahn pointed out in 1994 that producers had not really received 
a higher income, but that implicit tax decreases at best had served to stabilize real 
producer prices in the face of falling world prices.89 Pauline Peters stated that market 
liberalization did indeed provide some new income opportunities through the sale of 
tobacco and maize, but that the profits solely went to elite business leaders and larger 
farmers. Middle- and low-income groups in contrast experienced a deterioration in their 
income and food security.90 As contemporary WB data bases also show a contraction of 
GDP per capita in this period, the WB reports from the 1980s seem strangely inaccurate 
and overtly optimistic (see figure 9). The benefits some farmers and traders experienced 
                                                          
87 Ben Kaluwa, The Structural Adjustment Programme in Malawi: A Case of Successful Adjustment? (Harare, 
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88 World Bank, Third Structural Adjustment Operation No. P-4172-MAI (25-11-1985), 17. 
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were also divided unequally across the country; areas with sufficient infrastructure were 
much better able to sell of surpluses, while the closure of ADMARC depots in less 
connected areas meant that farmers saw their trade opportunities and therefore income 
diminishing. Most private traders and smallholders likewise lacked the credit and 
infrastructure support ADMARC had held, further inhibiting an effective private sector 
response.  
 
5.2 The Big 3 
While the adjustment programmes in Malawi were heavily focused on the agricultural 
sector, limited attention was also given to the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of MDC, ADMARC and Press Holdings, Malawi’s 3 biggest conglomerates. However, 
the steps taken in response to their monopolistic position were once again based on faulty 
assessments and as such led to detrimental policies. 
 At the start of the SAPs in 1981, the WB knew that there was an excessive 
concentration of ownership. However, because of the severe interconnectedness between 
MDC, ADMARC and Press and their close ties with the financial sector, all 3 companies 
were deemed ‘too big to fail’ for the Malawian economy. Under SAL-I conditionality, 
studies were therefore commissioned to develop ‘detailed plans’ for the restructuring of 
these companies.91 Starting in 1984, major assets that had previously been controlled by 
the state through the parastatal sector were sold to ‘private investors’ under a 
privatisation programme. As Sahle has pointed out, from the WB’s point of view, “the 
privatisation programme was not only a way of reducing state’s involvement in the 
economy, thus reducing opportunities for rent-seeking activities, but was also a means of 
encouraging the growth of entrepreneurs who were not closely tied to the state”.92 
However, the WB failed to see that the only people able to buy these assets were members 
of the state-backed elite. For the strangest of reasons, Banda’s own Press Corporation, at 
the time officially heavily indebted to the government, was even allowed to become one 
of the biggest buyers.93 In pushing for the privatisation programme, the WB had naïvely 
assumed that the lines between the public and private spheres in Malawi were clearly 
drawn and that as such private entrepreneurs would pop up and take over companies. 
                                                          
91 World Bank, Third Structural Adjustment Operation No. P-4172-MAI (25-11-1985), 15. 
92 Sahle, Democratisation in Malawi, 219. 
93 Ibid., 219-222; World Bank, Performance Audit Report Malawi. Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment 
Program No. 12156 (30-06-1993), 7-8. 
36 
 
The WB completely failed to understand the historical intertwinement of Malawi’s 
economic and political elite, as it had also failed to acknowledge the historical duality in 
the agricultural sector. 
 Stupendously, neither this assessment nor Malawi’s political economy really 
improved over the years. In 1988, ADMARC and MDC still owned 80% of the National 
Bank of Malawi and 70% of the Commercial Bank of Malawi.94 A WB report from 1993 
mentions that: 
 
“It has been argued that the excessive size, access to resources, and 
monopolistic/oligopolistic position in an array of economic activities of a particular 
industrial conglomerate, coupled with the smallness of Malawi’s domestic market, limits 
the scope for the development of a more competitive private sector and the growth of an 
entrepreneurial class”.95 
 
This however was no call to action. Instead, the report goes on to argue that ‘larger and 
more subtle questions’ should be answered instead and that the focus of any inquiry 
should not be a particular conglomerate. Later on, the concentration of economic power 
and control of the major banks by ‘particular business groups’ is once again discussed. 
However, the WB’s remedy is that this issue “…though sensitive, need[s] to be addressed 
in earnest by the political authorities”.96 This simply presents a continuation of the failure 
to truly understand Malawi’s social formation and political economy, as the political 
authorities are inherently connected to the business groups it should address. The WB 
even went as far as to shed responsibility. Noel Kulemeka, a senior WB economist in 
Malawi, declared in 1998: “Look, as far as the bank is concerned, once a country 
establishes a Privatisation Commission, we do not take the extra step to check who is 
buying off the assets formerly owned by the parastatal sector. You have to remember that 
we take the issue of sovereignty very seriously”.97 This seems highly arbitrary, as the 
privatisation of parastatal companies and far ranging price deregulations would as likely 
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qualify as sovereign issues. The WB didn’t seem concerned with sovereignty when it 
addressed these. 
 The WB was more successful in reducing ADMARC’s agricultural monopoly, but 
failed to see the marketing board’s importance for food security. While ADMARC had 
indeed over the years siphoned money away from smallholders, the profits made this way 
had enabled both ADMARC and the government to subsidise farm inputs (such as 
fertilizer) and control maize prices (through maize reserves). This way, ADMARC had 
managed to keep the production and consumer costs of maize low, although artificially. 
While the Malawian government had voiced its concerns with the effect of subsidy 
removal on food security, the ‘prudent’ elimination of fertilizer subsidies remained a 
condition for the SAL’s.98 Although the subsidies indeed took a toll on the government’s 
budget, their removal had nasty implications. In 1987, three simultaneous events 
catapulted Malawi from a routine national food surplus into a famine. The cassava meal 
bug decimated the north of Malawi, the central Shire valley was hit by a severe drought 
and increasing numbers of Mozambicans fleeing from the civil war (up to 1 million) 
increased the demand for food. Long accustomed to be able to buy low-priced maize in 
ADMARC markets, Malawians now found themselves queuing for rationed supplies. A 
household monthly maize consumption came to cost the equivalent of 40 days’ average 
wages.99 The reform processes between 1981 and 1987 ensured that ADMARC did not 
have the resources anymore to tackle these issues; in contrast, 1987 was the very year 
that ADMARC lost its official monopoly and the company was making losses, despite its 
financial connections. 
 The severe maize shortages did not only lead to human suffering, but had a 
detrimental effect on Malawi’s macro-economy as well. Food scarcity lead to hefty price 
increases, which fostered inflation, further increasing the price of imports such as 
fertilizers and industrial input. The shortages also led the government to import maize. 
The extra pressure this put on the budget led to raising interest rates, which pushed 
inflation further upwards. The WB thus became partly responsible for both a famine and 
a general failure to stabilize Malawi’s budget and trade balance. 
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Overall, the WB’s policies failed to accomplish their general goals of stimulating 
smallholder production and export diversification as to reignite and stabilize economic 
growth. In contrast, GDP per capita contracted in these years, while the profits which were 
made generally continued to accrue within the elite. If we take this into consideration, 
Malawi’s government is as much to blame for the economic woes of the 1980s and early 
1990s as the ill-advised policies the WB brought forth, as Banda and his allies intensified 
their self-aggrandizing schemes. However, the problem is that throughout the years the 
WB maintained that most policies were effectively implemented, WB supervision was 
steady and that the Malawian government was collaborative and strongly committed to 
the adjustment effort.100 The results in practice however stand in stark contrast with 
these confident statements. The WB continually failed to engage with the structural 
impediments to economic development in both the smallholder and industrial sector, 
which limited an efficient supply-side response to the supposedly increased market 
incentives and allowed Malawian’s elite to sustain itself. It was only at the beginning of 
the 1990s that a shift started to occur within the WB’s development approach, as the Bank 
started to acknowledge some of the constraints politics put on economic development. In 
Malawi, the New Institutional approach translated in a growing belief that the ‘iron 
triangle’ of Banda, his state apparatus and the pro-Banda clientelist class of agricultural 
and commercial entrepreneurs had to be removed or reformed to enable economic 
restructuring in earnest.101 The major political-economic transformation that was being 
advocated and its consequences for economic development are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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6. Political Reforms without Structural Change, 1991-2018 
 
Since independence, Banda’s regime had relied on the support of an indigenous elite, a 
strong suppressive security apparatus and the promise of affordable maize for its political 
stability. As the 1980s went on, the faltering economy and increasing budget deficits 
caused a failure of the postcolonial state to sustain these pillars. This eventually 
culminated in the relatively peaceful abdication of Banda in 1994 and the shift to a multi-
party democracy.102 The WB fulfilled a crucial role in this process, as Malawi’s high 
dependence on external aid had provided a useful leverage point to pressure the 
government into moving towards a multi-party system, in line with the recommendations 
of the WB’s new ‘good governance’ development agenda.103 However, the official political 
shift didn’t lead to sustained and shared economic growth. In contrast, the WB once again 
overlooked historical political-economic power relations, which have severely impeded 
socio-economic development till the present day. 
 
6.1 A Critique of the “Good Governance” Agenda 
The central problem for achieving success through the ‘good governance’ agenda has been 
the superficial nature of the democratic revolution which took place in Malawi with the 
elections of 1994, under the supervision of the international lending community. 
Although the regime change led to the diminishing importance of the pro-Banda section 
of the country’s bourgeoisie, the process towards a democracy with a new constitution 
remained highly elitist. In practice, this has translated into a mere 4-year reshuffling of 
self-interested members of the dominant class through a multi-party electoral 
competition, instead of a genuine democracy responsive to the needs of the broader 
population.104 
  Indicative of this elitist character has been the constitutional reform process. No 
one involved in the writing of the new constitution made any concerted efforts to include 
popular pro-democracy movements in the debate on its contents, despite of their 
importance for the eventual end of Banda’s rule. One of the points of issue which have 
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come to the fore was a clause that put ‘fluency in English’ as a condition to be allowed to 
run for parliament, while the second national language (Chichewa) is widely spoken. As 
Eunice Sahle has pointed out, this represented a “…blatant continuation of dominant class 
control of the political power structure with all its overt and implicit benefits”.105 The role 
of the WB in this process was noticeably absent, as it didn’t question the social and 
political power structures under which liberal human rights or the separation of powers 
were to be implemented. In contrast, the international lending community under the head 
of the WB came to predominantly support emerging elite-dominated parties - e.g. by 
funding radio election coverage - who were likely to win the elections.106 This way, donors 
mainly stimulated an elite driven procedural form of democracy as to ensure stability and 
continuity. While the intentions of avoiding further social unrest in a somewhat politically 
unstable environment were perhaps commendable, this approach helped create an 
unsubstantiated form of democracy as it presented no fundamental break with the past 
by allowing various groupings of the state-backed elite to take the reins. Although the 
following intra-elite competition for official political power generated some power 
diversification, it also largely reinforced the pre-existing structures of social and 
economic power by allowing the elite to continue and expand its economic activities.107 
This has hindered economic growth in both a direct way, through the costs of political 
competition, and an indirect way, through the maintenance of structural constraints on 
socio-economic development.  
 
6.2 The Costs of Political Competition 
The 1994 elections made Bakili Muluzi the first chosen president in Malawian history. 
Despite the difficult circumstances of 1994 (characterised by strikes, political unrest, low 
levels of aid and drought-induced hunger), his cabinet initially managed to improve socio-
economic performance.108 Between 1995 and 1997, investment and public finances 
recovered, partly thanks to the restoration of aid and investor confidence with the shift to 
democracy. The prior removal of cash crop restrictions fostered growth in the 
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smallholder sector, and there were early signs of economic diversification.109 However, 
progress was stunted by political competition and personal greed.  
In contrast to Banda, who had kept a strong centralised control over both the state 
and the economy, Muluzi saw himself confronted with an insecure, temporal power base 
(as he could actually lose elections) and a diversified parliament in which his party held 
no absolute majority. Lacking both Banda’s discursive legacy (as the country’s ‘founding 
father’) and repressive powers, Muluzi felt the need to underpin his political influence 
through extensively redistributing resources and buying loyalty. This ranged from putting 
loyalists on parastatal boards to increasing the size of his cabinet to create jobs for 
‘friends’, while also allowing the withdrawal of state funds by senior party members for 
political and personal ends.110 While self-enrichment was also widespread under the 
Banda regime, the socio-economic consequences were different. Banda had combined 
economic and political gestures with a clear development agenda in his attempt to 
promote economic growth through an elite-led estate-based model. In contrast, Muluzi 
acted ad-hoc from his more unstable power base to be able to exercise and cling on to 
political power. Bureaucrats and politicians were given influential positions to support 
Muluzi, which they in turn used to acquire farms, companies, hotels, schools and hospitals. 
Government jobs became ‘stepping-stones’ to business opportunities for Malawi’s well-
connected elite.111 The civil service also disintegrated throughout those years, as 
discipline broke down, staff prioritized its own business interests, rampant corruption 
spread and public-service provision declined.112 While it has been said that Banda and 
consortium ‘ate’ the profits, Muluzi’s regime ate both the profits and the country’s capital 
assets.113 
 The socio-economic consequences were detrimental, especially after the elections 
of 1999 when electoral competition led to large budget deficits. Interest payments rose 
from 9.1% in 1998-1999 to 28.4% in 2003-2004.114 Food insecurity increased, with one 
of the most poignant examples being the private sale of grain from the national grain 
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storage, which contributed to the famine of 2002-2003 and forced the government to 
borrow $28 million to make up for the resulting food shortage.115 Corruption became 
nearly all-encompassing in Malawi’s politics and civil service. Environmental degradation 
worsened, deindustrialization and joblessness rose and fiscal instability (interest and 
exchange rates, overspending, debt and inflation) increased.116 While there were 
improvements in education and literacy levels, as schools were built and primary 
education became free, Malawi’s HDI stagnated, mostly due to worsening health 
indicators (e.g. life expectancy fell from 46 in 1987 to 37 in 2005).117 
 Under Bingu Mutharika, who succeeded Muluzi in 2004, things seemed to improve, 
with a more growth-oriented development approach. Government finances were 
stabilized, economic growth steadily increased and top levels of the civil service were 
targeted in an anti-corruption drive.118 Inflation and interest rates were low, largely due 
to the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative of 2005, and smallholder production increased 
thanks to an internationally celebrated input subsidy programme (mostly seeds and 
fertilizer).119 However, growth and poverty reduction were once again short lived and 
turned out to mostly serve political goals. Malawi’s increased food security and economic 
performance between 2004 and 2009 helped Mutharika win a landslide victory in the 
2009 elections. As pointed out by Chinsinga and Poulton, the achievement of political 
security opened up different avenues of political control than governmental performance 
and as such diminished the political incentives which turned out to underpin the subsidy 
programme. Mutharika reverted to the ‘politics-as-usual’ mode, reducing the subsidy 
programmes, appointing friends and family members to high positions and started 
spending money on unnecessary things, such as a private jet.120 When donors withdrew 
their aid in response, the Malawian economy went into a tailspin. Mutharika’s sudden 
death in 2012 luckily did not lead to civil strife, but it coincided with the end of increased 
GDP growth from 2004 which had been sustained by high commodity prices on the world 
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market.121 Since then, the situation has improved little. In contrast, food insecurity has 
once again abounded and government debt risen greatly since 2008 and especially 
2011.122 Corruption has mostly worsened, despite donor pressure and the existence of an 
anti-corruption bureau, diminishing the effectiveness of public spending and severely 
impeding public sector reform and development goals.123 In retrospect, even the higher 
growth of the 2004-2010 period, which has been designated as an exception to Malawi’s 
recent history, has proven to be highly unequal.124 Income growth mostly benefited the 
urban population (a mere 16% of the country) and the higher income percentiles, 
reflected in both a slump in the pace of poverty reduction and an actual decrease of 
consumption among +-65% of the rural population (see figure 10 and 11). 
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6.3 Continued Constraints 
Apart from blatant corruption and largely unproductive policy making, the lack of broad, 
sustained growth results from the continued underdevelopment of the smallholder 
sector, which stems from the persisting elite-capture of political interest. Throughout the 
years, the WB has tried to stimulate growth through the smallholder sector by opening up 
new potential incomes streams for poor families to tap into, such as cash cropping. 
Deregulation and agricultural liberalization were supposed to create market incentives to 
make this happen. Production however has lagged behind despite these incentives. Even 
the production growth achieved between 2004 and 2012, thanks to the input subsidy 
programme under Mutharika, was temporary, with most of the benefits accruing with 
richer farmers.125 The agricultural reforms have largely failed because they have never 
successfully addressed the main problems underlying the lack of an effective supply-side 
response in the smallholder sector. These are still constituted by a lack of land and 
complementary investments such as infrastructural improvement. 
 Throughout the decades, the lack of land for many smallholders has been a 
recurring issue in Malawi. It was already politicised during Malawi’s shift to independence 
and has become increasingly so with the onset of the multi-party system.126 The already 
often mentioned concentration of land in the hands of estate owners has however 
remained unaddressed, precisely because it is a potentially volatile subject which the elite 
does not want to address and donors largely try to avoid.127 The former have their own 
economic and political interests, while donors often poorly understand the dimensions of 
agricultural reform and/or try to maintain a polite, workable relation with the Malawian 
government.128 Through an ever increasing population has this resulted in continuing 
land degradation, splintering of holdings, diminishing agricultural output and recurring 
food insecurity. 
 The most recent way the WB has tried to address this issue is by circumventing the 
hot potato of state-led land redistribution and attempting market-driven land reform. A 
pilot program between 2005 and 2011 (the CBRLDP) aimed to relocate 15,000 land-
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deprived families (as landowners in their own regions were unwilling to sell land) and 
provided them with the cash to acquire plots. The WB published a carefully optimistic 
assessment, designating the project outcome as ‘satisfactory’ (measured by increased 
farm output), although it also mentioned that the chances for further development were 
slim due to structural constraints which made it ill-advised to scale-up the programme.129 
The WB report does not describe these constraints in detail, but different literature 
mentions significant elite-capture of the pilot. Local elites gave preferential treatment to 
allies and friends to be included in the programme, while others had to bribe themselves 
into the project.130 The clientelistic selection procedure made possible through a lack of 
institutional oversight by the WB allowed well-connected beneficiaries to simply reap the 
(for Malawian standards) huge relocation sum of $1050 while they had no serious land 
problems to begin with.131 Likewise, the government went back on its promise to 
implement taxes on estates and cancel leases on idle plantations without consequences, 
clearly benefiting the interests of landowners close to central power.132 Basically, the 
project only benefited the elite, as it alleviated some land pressure in crowded regions 
without costing them land or money. As such, the WB report also came to conclude that 
scaling up of the programme should not be attempted until the government became 
serious with its commitment to land reform, as without some structural adjustments such 
as abolishing outdated land leases (resulting from the 1967 Land Act), there might not be 
enough incentive for landowners to sell their underused estates.133 This even leaves out 
conflicts over land between the newcomers and the present population (representing a 
clash between claims on the basis of ancestry, tribe, local power relations etc. vis-à-vis 
market rules and individual property rights), which the WB has said did not take place 
despite reports to the contrary.134 
 The programme’s success in increasing agricultural production was also limited. 
While at first the pilot seemed to have a beneficial effect, both the WB report and other 
research has pointed out that the increase in farm output was largely caused by the 
availability of credit as part of the programme, allowing e.g. for the purchase of hybrid 
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maize.135 Once the available seed packages and credit ran out, production growth was 
limited. This part of the reform pilot clearly points out the fundamental constraint which 
limited infrastructure places on the smallholder sector, both in the sense of transport and 
market accessibility, together with a lack of resources such as credit, hybrid seeds and 
irrigation.136 This has been both the result of donor behaviour, whom have often worked 
against e.g. seeds subsidies as impediments to the market, and Malawi’s historical focus 
on estate-based agriculture which has continued to circumscribe the necessary 
investments in smallholder’ agricultural infrastructure.137 
 
As such, the WB policies in Malawi of the last 24 years have yet to lead to the sustained, 
broadly shared economic growth which the WB says to aim for in its memoranda. The 
move to democracy - which under the heading of the ‘good governance agenda’ was 
supposed to foster growth by strengthening institutions and making the government 
responsive to the needs of the broader population – has unintentionally translated into a 
temporal and more unstable power base for Malawi’s leaders, counter-productively 
fostering short-term, predatory rent-creation. This has hindered Malawi’s development 
agenda, as most policies have come to follow patronage needs instead of those of the 
broader population, allowing the elite to expand its economic assets. Donors are partly to 
blame for this ineffective transformation, as they have often poorly monitored political 
shifts and failed to take a stronger role when necessary. In contrast, their funds make the 
government’s life easier because they step in in when food shortages or budget crises 
really get out of hand.138 
Likewise, the central reason why the CBRLD-programme has generated complex 
and unwanted outcomes is the deliberate ignorance of the political economy in which the 
pilot was implemented. Scant attention was paid to the social structure in which the 
programme would function. Instead, the land transfer was designed to be as depoliticised 
and ahistorical as possible as to avoid the inherent political and social tensions 
surrounding land reform in Malawi. Precisely this has meant that the programme did not 
work out so great and actually once again allowed the better-connected to reap the 
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benefits. The central problem “is the persistence of the idea that one technical tool [that 
is apolitical, purely ‘economic’ reform] is potentially able to address a wide set of 
historical, political, and social issues. While in reality this is very seldom the case, the 
expectations raised by the idea of change that this message conveys is a potent tool with 
which to hide the power dynamics that lie behind the reproduction of inequality, social 
exclusion, and marginality”.139  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis set out to verify the hypothesis that the lack of attention to economic history 
and political economy has severely hindered WB policies in Malawi to achieve their goals 
of inclusive and sustainable economic growth. The here presented political-economic 
analysis of both the SAPs of the 1980s and the good governance agenda from the early 
1990s onwards has shown that this has indeed been the case. Despite millions of dollars 
of aid and loans and intense WB involvement, little true alterations have been made to the 
mutually reinforcing economic and political structures which have defined Malawian 
society since the colonial era. The historical focus on primary commodity export and 
agriculture made the economy vulnerable to external shocks. Meanwhile, the extensive 
elite capture of the means of production and political control, which mimicked colonial 
institutions, inhibited economic reform. The WB’s failure to acknowledge and therefore 
address these historically grown structures has allowed for the continued self-
enrichment of Malawi’s elite, to the detriment of national development since the early 
1980s. The effective supply-side response by smallholders which the WB has sought has 
been blocked by severe infrastructural constraints, which partly resulted from the 
continued elite capture of economic and political power. Meanwhile, a lack of local 
knowledge among donors at times actually led to severe food shortages and macro-
economic disruptions, going directly against the goals set by the WB. 
The shift to the good governance agenda, which was supposed to finally take 
politics seriously as a factor in socio-economic development, largely failed to do so as the 
WB (with other donors in tow) was unwilling to directly engage with the political hurdles 
to successful development. While politics is often at the heart of governance and 
development failure, especially when it is intimately connected to direct economic 
interests, the WB has tried to avert these constraints by designing its policies to be as 
apolitical as possible. Political and economic power relations however do not simply 
disappear by dancing around them. By largely letting politicians off the hook, the WB has 
allowed the further expansion and consolidation of elite interests and much of its own 
efforts to go to waste. While the Bank’s Articles of Agreement logically prevent it from 
interfering directly in a country’s politics, it has nowhere been written that the Bank 
cannot withhold development assistance in whatever form if necessary for the benefit of 
development. They clearly did so on various occasions, such as during the SAPs and to 
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enforce a move to multi-party democracy (which is quite an interference in a country’s 
sovereignty). At the very least, the WB (and the donor community in general) could have 
more strictly monitored institutional reform and the actual implementation of 
development projects. While of course the Malawian government and elite are as much to 
blame for the lack of inclusive growth, the WB allowed them to and by providing funds 
actually made it easier.  It would go too far to write an extensive policy recommendation 
for Malawi here, but the above analysis at least suggests the severe necessity to finally, 
effectively address the structural constraints on Malawi’s smallholder sector by 
redistributing land, improving infrastructure and opening up access to credit, seeds and 
technical assistance. Above all, this means that donors have to dare to truly engage with 
the role of politics in socio-economic development, instead of shying away from the 
complications. They have to finally address the constraints put on development in Malawi 
by its highly elitarian political economy instead of allowing Malawi’s elite to misuse 
technocratic WB policies. 
While Malawi is just a case study, the intense involvement of the WB across the 
entire SSA-region and its continued tendency to use comparable economic measures, 
based on general economic theories and ‘best practice’ models (as discussed in the 
literature review), means that the Malawian experience can be extended to the general 
implementation of development economics in SSA. This experience underlines the 
literature of the past two decades which has extensively criticised the WB’s approach, 
while it also disqualifies the recent enthusiasm over the perceived changes in the WB’s 
thinking. The discursive admittance that local circumstances and politics matter hasn’t 
really affected implementation yet. Increasing the success of development economics in 
SSA will require proper attention to political economy and both the opportunities and 
constraints it offers for inclusive growth on a per-case basis. Merely introducing policies 
such as agricultural liberalization or market-driven land reform because they have 
worked elsewhere or are supposed to work in theory has proven to be a redundant form 
of development. Countries simply differ and therefore are in need of adapted, perhaps 
even wholly different economic policies if sustainable growth is to be achieved. Overall, it 
has been proven that the existing scepticism towards the benefits of a more politically 
aware development approach is thoroughly unfounded. 
The real question now seems to be how to change the current approach. The 
Almost Revolution will have to become an actual transformation of development policies 
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in practice. While we have the analytical proof, changing the institutionalised patterns of 
behaviour and theoretical convictions of the last 40 years will likely be difficult. It will 
require increased contextual knowledge among donors, the breaking of existing peer-
and-client expectations and reforming institutional cultures.140 It will also require greater 
humility concerning our economic theories. We’ll have to accept that there are clear limits 
to neoclassical market economics, as it doesn’t provide a very good understanding of how 
institutions and politics which define socio-economic structures develop over time. The 
recent increase in political-economic analyses is testimony to these shortcomings.141 This 
also offers an opportunity for further research, as additional contextualized country-
analyses will provide the tools to create change. 
Such a transformation will likely face resistance and hurdles along the way. 
However, the increasingly diverse debate and the incremental acceptance within major 
development institutions that politics and local circumstances matter are indicative of the 
broader felt need for change. While this should not give rise to complacency or overt 
optimism, it does offer the opportunity to change the dominance of neoclassical 
development which has permeated both the Washington and the (New) Post-Washington 
Consensus. By no longer viewing the socio-political order underlying market 
relationships as an isolated given can we change development economics for the better. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
140 Bridges and Woolcock, “How (Not) to Fix Problems”. 
141 Stilwell, “From Economics to Political Economy”. 
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